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Working Less and Living Longer: 
Long-term Trends in 
Working Time and Time Budgets 
J e s s e  H .  Ausube l  and A r n u l f  ~ r i i b l e r '  
"Even if . . .  the betterment of human fate can 
be effected only very slowly and fitfully by 
means of down-to-earth demands and cold 
calculations, the real lever remains 
nonetheless the unreasoned belief in the 
movement towards an edenic future, and after 
all that is also the only leaven of the 
generations of our youth." Andrh Breton, 
"Ode to Charles Fourier." 1945 
I. Introduction and Definitions 
Laborers have sought to shrink hours of work since time immemorial. 
Farm machines and external energy inputs to agriculture, culminating in the 
cheap and dependable tractor, provided the big break (Marchetti, 1979). 
With these, 80 percent or more of the population could live decoupled from 
the fields and move to town. As it turned out, the urban jobs to which 
people migrated initially demanded more time on an annual basis than the 
farm jobs . 
Work time in the early period of industrialization increased 
dramatically, up to 14-16 hours per day (Nowotny, 1989). The factory 
schedule extended the peak periods of agriculture, such as the harvest, to 
an all-year norm in early industries, such as textiles. At the same time, 
a qualitative transformation, in particular, continuous monetary evaluation 
of work time, occurred in the transition to industrial time (Hareven, 
1982) . 
With the increasing monetization of the economy, strengthening of 
government statistical offices, more systematic tax collection, and rise of 
labor movements, estimation of hours of paid work becomes possible for many 
countries in the middle to late nineteenth century. For well-documented 
industries such as manufacturing, railroads, and coal mining, the estimates 
appear accurate. Jones (1963) discusses in detail the methods used to make 
these estimates. We have not been able to locate reliable, consistent, 
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continuous time series data on work time in agriculture and industry prior 
to the 1850s.' 
Work t ime  in this paper refers to the number of hours a person 
engages in contracted and compensated work, whether aggregated for a week, 
year, or lifetime. The work time data to be presented and discussed cover 
only this regular salaried or compensated work. They omit paid vacations, 
holidays, and sick leave, which are included in the concept of total time 
paid for, a complementary series published by the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics and similar offices. Neither do the work time data cover 
housework or unpaid voluntary work, which we will refer to as unpaid l abor  
t ime .  To ta l  s o c i a l l y  o b l i g a t o r y  a c t i v i t i e s  embrace formal paid work as 
well as unpaid, informal work, child care and housework, and voluntary 
activities. We will refer to the combination of work time and unpaid labor 
time as t o t a l  l abor  t ime .  In contrast, f r e e  t ime may be allocated to 
various leisure activities. The combination of unpaid labor time and free 
time is referred to here as non-work. 
The most complete and accurate long time series on work time we have 
found are for the United Kingdom (Armstrong, 1984; Matthews et  a l . ,  1982; 
Williams, 1983), so we rely heavily on these. Moreover, the UK's long 
history of industrialization and leading position over much of this period 
make it an especially interesting subject of study. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. First, we analyze the 
quantitative trends in work time in the United Kingdom and other 
industrialized nations, then we compare the changing shares of life hours 
allocated to work and non-work, next we examine total labor and free time, 
and finally we discuss causes and consequences of the trends. We make 
gender as well as international comparisons. The fundamental fact, as we 
shall see, is that lifetime hours at work diminish, both absolutely and 
relatively. 
11. Reductions in Work Time: The UK 
Total life hours of work are the product of years in a career, weeks 
worked per year, and hours worked per week. We will discuss these three 
variables in turn for men, women, and then the total labor force. 
When the data begin in 1856, a career for a UK male averaged about 47 
years (Figure 1). Before education became mandatory, work began young, 
often around 10, and healthy men labored until they died. Armstrong (1984) 
estimated that careers for male workers lasted as long as 55 years for the 
surviving cohort. However, few lived to experience the natural end of such 
a long working career, so on average the duration was much ~horter.~ At 
age 10 males expected only about 48 more years of life, and at age 20 about 
40 more years. With a total life span of less than 60 years, few felt the 
need for pensions. The average male career lengthened to 52 years in the 
1930s, as a result of increased life expectancy, and has shortened since. 
The current duration of the average male work career is practically 
unchanged from the middle of the 19th century. 
Vacations, holidays, and other reductions to weeks worked per year 
gradually increased from less than 2 to about 6 weeks between 1856-1981. 
Decreases in the number of weeks worked per year amount to about 17% of the 
total reduction in work time for UK males over this period (Table 1). More 
dramatically, the average weekly work time dropped by one-third from 63 to 
fewer than 42 hours between 1856-1981. 
Women in the United Kingdom, like men, work fewer hours per week and 
also enjoy more vacation, but notably, are lengthening their careers 
(Figure 2). Prior to World War 11, the length of female careers averaged 
under 20 years. In 1950 the average female career began stretching and has 
now reached 30 years. The average female work week of some 29 hours in 
1981 is 30 percent lower than for male workers due to the significant share 
of part-time jobs of women. 
Figure 1 Working time indicators (hours/week, weeks/year, years at 
work) for male working population in the UK, 1856-1981. Data Source: 
Armstrong (1984), Matthews et dl. (1982), 
\ 
\ 
The average length of a career for the entire male and female UK work 
force has changed little (Figure 3). During more than a century 40 years 
remain the reference point. Reductions in career length of male workers 
have balanced corresponding increases in female participation rates and 
career lengths. The stable duration of a career sharply contrasts the 
strong decline in hours worked during the average career.3 
Simple arithmetic on the data of Figures 1 and 2 yields estimates of 
life hours at work. Stable, long trends emerge (Figure 4). Lifetime hours 
at salaried work have been reduced for males by 428, from 150 to 88 
thousand hours, and for females by 378, from 63 to 40 thousand hours. For 
women, most of the reduction came prior to 1931. Because 1931 was the 
nadir of an economic depression which brought high unemployment and 
restructuring of the labor force, we somewhat arbitrarily choose that year 
as the hinge to break the analysis into greater detail (Table 1). Since 
then, women's lifetime work hours have shrunk only around 700 hours. The 
reductions from shorter work days and weeks as well as longer vacation 
periods have been almost offset by the rise in average female career 
length. 
For the whole work force, the average per capita reduction in 
lifetime hours at work between 1856-1981 amounted to about 55 thousand 
hours, from 124 to 69 thousand hours. We have no information on changes in 
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Figure 2 Working time indicators for female working population in the 
UK, 1856-1981. Data Source: Armstrong (1984), Matthews et a1.(1982), 
Williams (1983) 
\ 
\ 
the variance or on subpopulations within the work force other than by 
gender. 
Straight lines fit the data well. Extrapolated, the lines suggest 
that gradually both men and women will work less: in the year 2050 women 
possibly 30 and men about 70 thousand hours during a lifetime.4 The hours 
worked by women and men converge slowly, reducing the gender gap between 
male and female work roles in society. 
In fact, when the data on work careers for women and men are examined 
together, women appear to be gradually substituting for men in the labor 
force (Figure 3). While in the middle of the 19th century some 30 percent 
of the work force was female, their share has increased to about 40 percent 
at present. This increase, together with the lengthening of female careers 
since 1950, multiplies the share of labor by women in the UK workplace when 
calculated over the entire work career period. The female share of 
career-years doubled from about 15% in 1856 to 30% in 1981. 
If we hold constant at the 1980 value the length of the male and 
female careers at 46 and 30 years, work weeks at 46 per year for both 
genders, and female participation in the work force at 408, the projected 
lifetime hours in 2050 translate to a 33 hour workweek for men and a 22 
hour workweek for women, or 27 hours for both men and women. Clearly, all 
the variables can change. We present this scenario because the duration of 
the workweek is probably most easily appreciated. 
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Figure 3 Years at work of female, male and average working population 
in the UK 1 8 5 6 - 1 9 8 1 .  Data Source: Armstrong ( 1 9 8 4 ) ,  male data corrected 
for average life expectancy. 
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Total - 2 6 , 8 3 0  - 3 4 , 8 1 0  - 6 1 , 6 4 0  - 2 2 , 2 4 0  -710  - 2 2 , 9 5 0  
....................................................................... 
'changes in hours worked per week (lower values for women due to their 
shorter work career). 
'changes in weeks worked per year (lower values for women due to their 
shorter work career). 
3~hanges in years worked. 
Lifetime Work Hours (1000) 
Men 149.7 122.9 88.0 
Women 62.8 40.5 39.8 
Consider briefly reasons for the steady reductions of life hours of paid 
work. Social scientists have long sought explanations for changes in work 
time. In A T h e o r y  o f  Wages ,  Douglas (1934) saw reduction in hours of work 
as an outcome of decisions by workers when rates of pay have increased. 
Workers choose to divide the benefits of productivity gains between 
additional income and leisure. Douglas also viewed reduction in years 
spent in the labor force as a consequence of higher family incomes and 
government expenditures on pensions. Owen (1978, 1979) reviewed and 
extended the economic argument, exploring how entrepreneurs in a 
competitive market will try to minimize their labor costs by seeking the 
hours schedule that will attract the best labor at the cheapest cost. He 
argued that changed preferences of employees will induce employers to 
shorten hours of work, all to minimize labor cost. Several economic 
studies pertain at the level of the household (e.g., Ghez and Becker, 1975; 
(Becker, 1976). Sociologists such as Dumazedier (1989) have emphasized the 
role of permanent scientific revolutions enabling workers to produce more 
in less time. The relative power of different social classes and groups 
then distributes the time thus generated, along with the wealth produced, 
according to historians such as Thompson (1967). 
1000 Hours 
Figure 4 Lifetime hours at work of female, male and average working 
population in the UK 1856-1981. 
One might summarize by saying that several plausible theories contend 
to explain declines in working time, but difficulties also persist with 
their applications. From a phenomenological point of view, economists are 
hard-pressed to explain why the propensity for reducing work would persist 
over more than 100 years and a wide range of incomes. The market economics 
also do not explain adequately the similar trends we document later in 
nations where labor markets have been tightly controlled by government. 
Moreover, some empirical findings show that higher wages increase rather 
than decrease hours of work (National Commission for Manpower Policy, 
1978). Among managers and professionals, evidence is mixed that higher 
wages reduce work hours (Harriman, 1982). Schor (1991) finds that annual 
hours of fully employed Americans increased modestly between 1969-1987. 
Other challenges arise in explaining the differing behavior of men and 
women. Can a pure economic argument explain the discontinuity that 
occurred in female work careers in the United Kingdom in the 1950s? We 
agree with Sharp (1981) and Juster and Stafford (1991) that the economics 
of time are little studied and poorly understood. Common to the contending 
theories are the inexorable forces of technological change, as remarked by 
Leontieff (1978), a point to which we shall return. 
111. Reductions in Work Time: International Comparisons 
Table 2. International Comparison of Hours Worked per Person per Year 
(Source of Data: Maddison, 1991). 
Ratio of 
Year France FRG UK USA Japan Japan / USA 
Should we generalize from the case of the United Kingdom to other 
countries? Although long time series data on lifetime work hours are 
unavailable, data on annual average hours worked for numerous countries 
suggest that the UK behavior is representative. Trends in annual hours 
worked should be revealing in view of the observed stability of the length 
of the work career. Szalai et al. (1972) and Blyton (1985) further 
reassure us by showing many similarities in time budgets in dozens of 
countries. 
Until about 1930, reductions in annual per capita work time were 
similar in the industrialized countries, as shown in Table 2 and Figure 5. 
Thereafter, North America and Europe made larger downward adjustments in 
work time than Japan, with a re-convergence as well. Between about 1930 
and 1960, Japan largely resisted reductions in work.5 Thus, the hours 
Japanese now work are shifted several decades compared to other 
industrialized countries. The Japanese work today some 400 hours per year 
longer than, for instance, Americans and approximately as long as in other 
industrial countries before mid-~entury.~ 
International comparisons of competitiveness often neglect the effect 
longer work time may have on Japanese economic performance. Surely the 
Japanese spending much more time at work profoundly affects production and 
consumption, savings, and firm organization. In terms of the dichotomy 
between production and consumption, the Japanese have chosen to stay in the 
workplace to support consumption abroad of automobiles, consumer 
electronics, and other goods. As seen below, a more complicated picture 
emerges when consideration is given not only to formal, contracted work, 
but also to other, primarily domestic types of labor activities. The fact 
that the Japanese work more does not necessarily imply that they enjoy less 
free time. 
IV. Work Time versus Non-Work Time 
Formal work is one aspect of social life. Obviously, if work time 
shrinks, the times of life that are not part of the formal work contract 
expand. During high unemployment in Western Europe in the early 1980s, 
experts in social research commented: 
The formalized work contract has historically become the 
central issue in industrialized countries. It does not only 
regulate the standard of life, but is also the most important 
factor for social integration. The economic crisis and rapid 
technological change have created a shortage of jobs, and 
labor-market policies try to find new ways for redistribution 
(shortening of working time, more flexible working hours, job 
sharing). Nevertheless, formal work seems to lose its 
traditional unique and central place. One indicator for this 
are the growing discussions on the importance of other, 
'informal' sectors of work and service. When looking at work 
in such a general sense we are faced with the big problem of 
having to find a new equilibrium between the historically 
Figure 5 Average annual hours worked in selected countries 1870-1987 
Data Source: Table 2. 
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established sector of guaranteed employment and other (still) 
informal sectors. (Eurosocial, 1983). 
Jahoda (1988) suggests to study those relatively enduring aspects of people 
and social institutions, which undergo only gradual, hardly perceptual 
changes, arguing that "employment as an institution whose time structure 
shapes the entire way of life of an industrial society has not changed; 
neither has the need of people for institutionally supported time 
experiences." 
Here we analyze quantitatively the eroding relative position of work 
time. Our hypothesis is simply that work time and alternative uses of time 
compete for the individual's total time. To test the hypothesis, a 
standard of total life hours is necessary. Historical data on longevity 
(Flora et al., 1987) provide the standard for retrospective analysis. 
Demographic models are available to project future total life hours. 
Historical data (Figure 6) fit well to a logistic function, which projects 
life expectancy increasing by about 5% over the next few decades, to almost 
80 years on average for men and women. 
Comparing life hours of work to total disposable, active non-work 
hours yields the fractions of the lifetime time budget at work and other 
activities. Disposable hours are calculated by subtracting 10 years for 
childhood and first elementary education and also required physiological 
time, i-e., 10 hours per day for sleep, eating, and personal hygiene. 
Figure 6 Life expectancy at age 10, UK 1870-1980, in 1000 hours and 
years. Data Source: Flora et al. (1987). 
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Figure 7 Disposable lifetime hours for work and non-work for average 
working population, UK 1856-1981, in 1000 hours. 
Between 1856 and 1981 disposable lifetime hours increased from 242 to 356 
thousand hours in the United Kingdom, while, as we calculated above, the 
average working hours decreased from 124 to 69 thousand hours. Thus, 
non-work hours increased from about 118 to 287 thousand hours over a 
lifetime (Figure 7). While in 1856 50% of the disposable lifetime of 
workers was spent working, the portion has fallen to less than 20% today 
(Figure 8). Both reduced lifetime working hours and increased life 
expectancy caused the shift. 
For men, this transition was crucial in both relative and absolute 
values. In 1856 about 150 thousand hours of a male's lifetime were spent 
at the workplace and only some 91 thousand hours outside it (not 
considering physiological time). The former figure decreased to some 88 
thousand hours, while the latter increased threefold to about 256 thousand 
non-work hours in 1981. In other words, from 1856 to 1981 the fraction of 
the disposable lifetime of a UK male spent working fell from three-fifths 
to one-fourth, with the crossover from a majority of work to non-work 
occurring around 1900. 
Alternately, we can assess the ratio of non-work time to work time. 
In 1856 the ratio was around 0.6 for men, 2.9 for women, and 0.95 for the 
average working population. By 1981 the ratio of other to work time 
increased to 2.9 for men, 8.4 for women, and 4.2 for the average working 
population. All these measures dramatize how much consumption, or the 
non-productive sphere (to use a term formerly employed in socialist 
economies), dominates social activity in industrialized countries. The 
change is expressed throughout the economy, for example in the energy 
Figure 8 Fraction of disposable lifetime spent at work and non-work of 
female, male and average working population, UK 1856-1981. 
Percent of 
disposable 
lifetime 
100 
sector, where demand for personal transport and residential purposes 
exceeds industrial demand (Schipper et al., 1989). 
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V. Non-Work, Total Labor, and Free Time 
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What is the nature of the many hours of non-work? In youth 
activities center around education and recreation. Then, during the 
typical 40-year work career, one-third of the disposable time is spent at 
the work place and two-thirds are spent raising children, doing household 
work, and in leisure and holiday activities. After retirement, time is 
used for recreation, leisure activities, and, with aging, much expenditure 
goes for health maintenance. 
We can further disaggregate the evolving lifetime time budget into 
hours spent in childhood and elementary education, higher education, work, 
non-work activities (i.e., other socially obligatory activities and free 
time) during the active working career years, and finally time after 
retirement. We always exclude required physiological time in the 
calculations. Again the changes in lifetime time budgets result from the 
combined evolution of two variables: changes in lifetime hours devoted to 
various activities (the numerator) and increasing life expectancy (the 
denominator). The latter explains the decreasing fraction childhood and 
elementary education account for in a male lifetime, from 17% to 13% 
(Figure 9). In the absence of data we have assumed childhood and 
elementary schooling to remain constant at 10 years. 
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Figure 9 Allocation of lifetime to different activities for male 
working population in the UK 1856-1981, in fraction of disposable 
lifetime (excluding physiological time). 
The decrease in fraction of time spent at work from over half of the 
total lifetime hours to less than one-fourth is another quantitative 
illustration of the transition from work to non-work discussed above. The 
increase in non-work activities allocates unevenly between different life 
stages. The smallest gains in non-work time are observed during the active 
working career. Non-work activities before (i-e., education beyond 
elementary schooling) and after (i.e., retirement) the work career have 
increased from zero to 20% of the disposable lifetime time budget of UK 
men. 
The increase in the time devoted to higher education reflects the 
growing importance of pre-work preparation (see, e.g., Matthews et al., 
1982:106). Following the Elementary Education Act of 1870, compulsory 
education of 8 years became mandatory in the UK. In 1972 compulsory 
education years were for the last time increased to a total of 11 years. 
Of course, the average value of 20% of a disposable male lifetime spent at 
education masks heterogeneity in the length of pre-work education from 
minimum compulsory schooling to doctoral degrees. After the turn of the 
next century as much as one-fourth of the lifetime of the average male 
worker may pass before starting on the job. 
The component of the male non-work time budget which has risen the 
fastest is the time after the active working career: retirement. Whereas 
in the 1930s the average male life expectancy did not exceed the years 
spent at education plus the length of an average work career, the situation 
has changed drastically since. Retirement now accounts for about 13% of 
the average disposable male lifetime time budget in the UK. With 
increasing longevity of the population and further reductions in work time, 
the fraction of time in "life after work" (Young and Schuller, 1991) could 
increase to about one-fourth of the total work force life span during the 
next two to three decades. 
If the trends should continue, after the year 2000 as much as half of 
the lifetime of the worker will be accounted for by pre- and after-work 
activities. Even in the remaining half of an individual's lifetime, formal 
work will account for a decreasing fraction of time, 30% or less, and leave 
more time for leisure and other activities such as caring for children and 
the home. 
To this point we have focused on contracted, compensated working 
time, treating other activities mainly as residuals. Now we define labor 
from a more inclusive perspective, encompassing all socially obligatory 
activities. These include, for example, raising and caring for children, 
household work, and economically grey activities, whether these add 
numerical value to national income accounts or result in other forms of 
monetary or non-monetary c~mpensation.~ The data analyzed were assembled 
from Hungarian research on time budgets (Falussy and Boda, 1989).' Their 
span of 25 years is a shorter time than the data for the United Kingdom. 
They yield, nonetheless, insights into the division of time between total 
labor and free activities in several countries and between genders. 
Extension of the study of work time to socially obligatory activities also 
adds perspective on the gender gap, seen in the long analysis of formal 
contracted work in the United Kingdom. We have complemented and updated 
the data from the Hungarian source with information for Japan (Statistics 
Bureau, 1987), the United Kingdom (Gershuny, 19891, the United States and 
the former USSR (Gershuny, 1989, 1992; and Robinson et dl., 1988).' 
In the following we consider the ratio of free to total labor time, 
measured by the ratio of time devoted to the two activity categories and 
again excluding physiological time. A ratio of 0.5 means that one-half as 
much disposable time is devoted to free or leisure time as to total labor; 
a ratio of 1.0 means that free and total labor time are equal. 
As societies become more affluent, free time steadily increases 
compared to the time devoted to all labor, as evident from Figures 10a and 
lob, which show the trend in several countries of the ratio for the male 
and female population separately, plotted against per capita Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). The male population in the city of Pskov (Russian USSR) is 
an exception, with a stagnant free time compared to total labor time 
between 1965 and 1986. Another anomalous movement in the ratio is in 
Poland, where decreasing per capita GDP nevertheless accompanies the 
increasing free time seen in more prosperous countries. One interpretation 
of this anomaly is that the economic depression in Poland is a brief 
phenomenon, while change in the time budget rides through the ups and downs 
of economic performance. Perhaps the movement towards more free time that 
accompanies economic development cannot be reversed without large social 
disruptions even in periods of economic crisis, especially when these 
periods are marked by labor surplus. 
The gender gap in free to total labor time in Figure lob compared to 
Figure 10a appears smaller in more affluent societies, despite differences 
that remain between countries and cultures. In all but two societies 
assessed, women spend more total time in labor than men and thus enjoy less 
free time. The exceptions are the United States and the United Kingdom. 
In these countries, when considering all socially obligatory activities, 
women appear to enjoy more free time than men, perhaps because men devote 
more time to household work and raising children than in the other 
countries examined. The gender gap in the ratio of free to total labor 
time is particularly large in Eastern Europe. In Bulgaria, the gap even 
widened, as only men enjoyed more free time with economic development. 
F i g u r e  10a Free time to total labor time ratios versus per capita GDP 
for male population of selected countries, 1961-1986. 
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Also noteworthy is Japan, where the ratio behaves like other 
industrialized countries, despite a longer average paid time at the work 
place. Thus, although Japanese on average spend much more time in regular, 
compensated work, they nevertheless enjoy an amount of free time similar to 
people in other countries with a comparable degree of economic development. 
A basic budgetary principle in time allocation may be observed here, that 
people working more in formal economic activities adjust time spent for 
housework and child care rather than free or leisure activities proper. 
Overall, the upward diagonal movement in Figure 10 resembles our 
earlier observation of the evolution of lifetime budgets for work and 
non-work. As societies become more affluent, the population spends less 
time in regular, salaried work at the workplace, and more time in informal 
work, at home, and for leisure. 
VI. Observations and Questions 
Earlier we pointed out that workers in the United Kingdom and similar 
countries formally work about 40 years and live close to 80. Workers do 
not work about half their lifetime, and the fraction of non-work keeps 
increasing. Moreover, within working years, the hours of work are 
diminishing. With increasing affluence, the ratio of free to all socially 
obligatory time is approaching 1 and could eventually surpass 1. On 
average, even the working population will then spend at least as much time 
for free activities as for all other labor taken together. 
We conclude by exploring a few of the causes and consequences of the 
reductions in work time and related phenomena. With respect to causation, 
we focus on technology. With respect to consequences, we consider the rise 
of the service economy. Then we pose some final issues and questions. 
We mentioned earlier the inexorable role of technology in raising 
productivity and thus at least creating the possibility of liberating work 
time. The relations between technology and time are not simple. The 
complexity of the relations are demonstrated by considering technology and 
women's labor. A logical hypothesis is that inventions easing household 
labor, limiting family size, and improving child health enabled women to 
increase their participation in the work force. 
Recall some inventions affecting women. When the tin can was 
introduced in the 19th century, seers predicted that the reduction in time 
needed for meal preparation would lead to more time spent outside the home. 
Electrical appliances were forecast to have a similar effect: the iron 
(1882), sewing machine (1889), stove (1896), clothes washing machine 
(1907), and domestic refrigerator (1918) (dates from Desmond, 1987). When 
America's Mr. Birdseye successfully marketed frozen foods in 1929, the tin 
can statements from 50 years earlier were repeated. 
In fact, in the United Kingdom and the United States (see Harris, 
1981) women did not lengthen their working careers until about 1950, when 
many household inventions achieved widespread diffusion. Innovations 
increase variety and quality of diet, improve cleanliness, and allow an 
individual to care for a larger amount of space. However, such 
innovations, at least before they became pervasive and complementary of one 
another, little altered the domestic labor time (Strasser, 1982; Vanek, 
1974). Comparison of time use in the United States in 1965 with earlier 
studies showed only minor changes occurring since the 1930s (Robinson and 
Converse, 1967). Minge-Kalman (1980), reviewing studies of several 
industrial societies, found that women's daily work outside the home 
decreased while work inside the home increased for an overall net increase. 
In contrast, Gershuny and Robinson (1989) reported that between the 1960s 
and the 1980s women reduced the amount of time spent daily in housework. 
Regardless of effects of domestic technologies, innovations such as 
the oral contraceptive (1951) and measles vaccine (1953) which have made it 
possible to have fewer and healthier children, along with attitudinal 
changes and associated social innovations such as day care centers, 
superficially match well with the onset of the dramatic increase in years 
women spend in paid work. But, female fertility has declined gradually in 
the industrialized nations for over a century, without any downward 
discontinuity following World War 11. In fact, this period was marked by a 
brief baby boom. We conclude that technology serves the revealed social 
goal of reducing life hours of work primarily via productivity increases at 
the workplace. In other fields of endeavor technology increases 
productivity, so to speak, but often without altering time allocation. 
In any case, working less and living longer implies new balances and 
structures of production and consumption and new areas of economic growth. 
Consumption now dominates production as a social activity. A typical life 
of 80 years may be spent about 40 years consuming and 40 both producing and 
consuming. When consumption dominates production, we are in the service 
economy. The service industries are transport, communications, 
entertainment, retail, banking, education, and health, and not 
manufacturing, mining, and agriculture. 
When consumption is the main activity of a day or a life, most work 
in restaurants, hotels, schools, media, fitness centers, banks, and health 
care organizations. Service dominates employment and over the long run may 
especially favor medicine and recreation as well as information handling. 
In a society which lives longer and works less, people can worry more about 
youth and beauty and health. 
Gershuny (1989) argued that leisure in the so-called leisure society 
makes the work and that the non-work activities enable the consumption of 
ever increasing outputs of products and services of affluent societies. It 
is uncertain to what extent the more individuals produce, the more time 
they need for consumption. We can spend money fast, purchasing costly 
items in a twinkling. An expensive one-week tour takes no more time than a 
cheap one-week camping. Nevertheless, if technology makes a society with 
more productive potential but insufficient time to consume more, then 
balancing the system requires more time for consumption as well as the 
money to pay for it. 
Numerous policy issues emerge. A fundamental issue is whether 
society yet reflects in its employment, pension, and educational policies 
the dominance non-work and free time have obtained over work. Policy, for 
example, with respect to reform of welfare, still appears geared to the 
primacy of the formal work contract. Our knowledge of the time patterns of 
the non-working population, including the elderly, needs to be deepened.'' 
The observed persistence in average work career length of around 40 
years also raises policy issues, for example, about workplace change and 
performance. The jobs evolve, the work force turns over, working hours are 
reduced, but years of work and the length of social memory of the workplace 
remain roughly constant. This regularity may be valuable for employers and 
government to recognize in developing policies for education and 
re-training, especially in conditions of rapid technological change and 
corresponding changes in skill requirements. With further work time 
reduction within these 40 years, new organizational models of distributing 
work activities should be possible. For instance, like just-in-time 
inventory, a just-in-time labor force may be assembled (Kutscher, 1988). 
The 27-hour average work week may match well with lots of temporary 
workers. 
Research questions also abound. Why does the system at the macro 
level exhibit stable behavior over more than a century despite 
discontinuities in underlying individual variables such as weekly working 
hours or female career lengths?'' Why do we partition the additions to 
non-work between education, retirement, and other options as we do? Why 
have most countries adopted the same divisions between work and non-work at 
different stages of their industrialization? Will the historically 
observed rates of change continue? If not, what will slow or speed them? 
The closing question must be how far reductions in work time will go. 
Our response is to look back. Recall that in hunter-gatherer tribes men 
worked only three hours each day.12 Perhaps 10,000 years after the 
invention of farming humanity will come full-circle. If the earth's 
environment can be preserved and our social structures improved, then in 
another 200 years or so we may return to the leisurely life of the Garden 
of Eden. 
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ENDNOTES 
Wilensky (1961) provides estimates of work time in eras ranging from 
the Roman to the 20th century, but no continuous and comparable data 
series. Imhoff (1981) presents a scattering of interesting facts 
about changes in time budgets over the past 300 years. See also 
Schor, 1991, p. 45. 
Only by 1930 was the male life expectancy at age 10 long enough to 
allow the average male in the United Kingdom to live until the end of 
a typical working career of some 52 years prevailing at that time. 
Age 10 may sound today like an early starting point for the analysis 
in this paper. However, child labor was normal in the 19th century. 
In the United Kingdom Ashley's Act excluded girls and boys under age 
10 from the mines only in 1842. Fielden's Act of 1847 established a 
"normal" working day of 10.5 hours for young people (and women) in 
factories. 
If schooling lasts 10-15 years and a work career 40 years, then 
the lifetime of the human capital stock (its formation, 
integration, and use in the production sphere of the economy) 
is about 50-55 years. This clock sets the speed of social 
learning. The ultimate limits to the speed of diffusion of 
innovations are human minds. Individuals and groups early on 
often become locked into particular procedures and technical. 
know-how and unable to accept new ideas or practices. 
Replacing entirely a workplace organization or any other human 
system that is no longer satisfactory can require some 50 
years, if the system is fixed in the minds of the current 
managerial and labor force and is taught to the young. 
Fourasti6 (1965) proposed that early in the 21st century the working 
career would already be reduced to 40,000 hours. ~ccording to our 
analysis, f our as tie's forecast was several decades early. 
Although relatively early retirement is customary for employees of 
some large Japanese corporations, we have not been able to find 
evidence that length of careers on average in Japan differs 
significantly from that in other countries examined, so the use of 
annual hours should be representative. 
For accounts of Japanese attitudes toward work time, see the New York 
Times, 6 August and 31 December 1988. 
Minge-Kalman (1980) uses the terms "productive" and "reproductive" 
(or domestic) labor to span total labor time. 
For reviews of literature on time budget surveys and analyses, see 
Andorka (1987), Harvey et al. (1984), and Juster and Stafford (1991). 
The data on the then Soviet city of Pskov may not be precisely 
comparable to national average data in other countries and are 
affected also by the problems of estimating comparable USSR Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) figures as indicators of economic development 
(see Krelle, 1988, on this point, from where we derive the GDP 
estimates for the USSR). 
On the use of time of the non-employed see Harvey (1989); for 
economic research on the elderly see Hurd (1990); for a sociological 
perspective see Young and Schuller (1991). 
11. Young (1988) has sought deep mechanisms in the temporal behavior of 
human society. 
12. Studies among many foraging groups give comparable results; see 
Sahlins (1974) and Gross (1984:526). 
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